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THE CLOUDS ARE LIFTING: THE PROBLEM
OF TITLE TO SUBMERGED LANDS IN
ALASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
Ownership of Alaska's submerged lands has been disputed ever
since Alaska gained statehood.1 At stake is title to a sizeable amount
of land,2 some of which is highly valued for natural resources like
gold, oil, sand, and gravel. The federal government, the State of
Alaska, and Native groups all have conflicting title claims to owner-
ship of the lands under Alaska's lakes, rivers, and streams. Resolution
of these conflicting claims has been complicated by the methods used
by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") to survey public land
conveyances. Discrepancies between the survey methods used in
Alaska and the methods used in the lower forty-eight states have im-
posed staggering administrative, financial, and litigation burdens on all
parties to Alaska title disputes.3
Recently, two significant events have occurred that directly affect
the determination of title claims to submerged lands in Alaska. In
1988 Congress passed an amendment to the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act4 ("ANILCA") that, in effect, ratifies an
agreement between the federal government, the State of Alaska, and
Native groups that the methods for conveying Alaska's submerged
lands should conform to those used in other states.5 When Congress
ratified this agreement, it eliminated the final barrier hindering the effi-
cient surveying and conveyance of these lands. By imposing a uniform
standard on all states, Congress has ensured that undue hardship will
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1. For an excellent discussion of the controversy surrounding the disposition of
submerged lands in Alaska up until 1988, see Duncan Hollomon, The Struggle for
Alaska's Submerged Land, 5 ALASKA L. REv. 69 (1988). This note addresses the
subsequent developments in the area of title disputes over submerged lands in Alaska.
2. Estimates of the amount of submerged lands in Alaska range from 783,000
acres (Alaska Department of Natural Resources estimate) to 1,895,000 acres (Bureau
of Land Management estimate). Hollomon, supra note 1, at 78 n.48 (citing Memoran-
dum from the Director of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources to the Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Land Management, Alaska State Office (May 1, 1987)).
3. See, eg., CONG. REc. 23,377 (1980).
4. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C. & 48 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ANILCA].
5. 43 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988).
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no longer be imposed on parties with claims to Alaska's submerged
public lands.
Additionally, a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, Alaska v.
Ahtna, Inc., 6 helps redress the inequity of imposing a uniform national
standard for resolving title litigation over submerged lands that does
not adequately take into account the uniqueness of Alaska's geogra-
phy. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the federal test of navigability in a
broad manner, thereby allowing the State of Alaska to lay claim to
title to a greater acreage of submerged lands. By making the standard
more flexible, the Ninth Circuit overcomes the inequity of defining
navigability in a manner that excludes a large percentage of Alaska's
waterways.
Both of these recent developments give the State of Alaska
greater control of Alaska's submerged lands in a manner that corre-
sponds more exactly to the control exercised by other state govern-
ments. This note will assess the origins, rationale, and impact of these
developments on submerged lands ownership. Parts II and III pro-
vide an overview of the historical approach to determining title to sub-
merged lands under the equal footing doctrine of the United States
Constitution and under the federal test of navigability set out in The
Daniel Ball.7 The purpose and effects of Congress' amendment of
ANILCA are presented in Part IV, and Part V discusses the reasoning
and impact of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the concept of navi-
gability in Gulkana 1I. Finally, this note addresses the possible com-
bined effects of the ANILCA amendment and the Ninth Circuit
decision on future submerged lands title disputes.
II. DETERMINING TITLE TO SUBMERGED LANDS UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
8
With few exceptions, title to land under waters that are navigable
belongs to the states. Title to lands beneath non-navigable waters, on
the other hand, remains in the federal government. Under both the
equal footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act,9 federal law de-
fines navigability, and thus federal law ultimately determines who has
title to submerged lands in Alaska.
6. 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990) ("Gulkana
River I1'). As cases dealing with submerged lands are commonly referred to by the
body of water involved, for the purpose of clarity subsequent citations of these cases
will use this form.
7. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
8. For additional discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see Hollomon, supra
note 1, at 73-75.
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1988).
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Although not explicitly stated in the United States Constitution,
the equal footing doctrine is derived from Article IV, Section 3.10 The
doctrine establishes that all states, at the time they are admitted to the
Union, are considered to be on "equal footing" with the original thir-
teen states.11 The significance of this doctrine for submerged lands
disputes becomes apparent when one examines the origins of title to
these lands. Prior to the Revolutionary War, the English crown held
title to all navigable waters within its boundaries, and the lands sub-
merged beneath the navigable waters were held in trust for the people
as a whole.12 Title was viewed as an essential attribute of sovereignty
because it gave the sovereign the ability to control trade and naviga-
tion upon commercially useful waterways for the public good.13
Following the Revolutionary War, the thirteen original states, in
their sovereign capacity, succeeded to title in the submerged lands
within their state boundaries. 14 By virtue of the equal footing doc-
trine, all territories subsequently admitted to statehood also succeeded
to title in the lands submerged beneath their navigable waterways. 15
Such title "is conferred not by Congress but by the Constitution it-
self.' 16 Conversely, if a waterway is non-navigable at the time of a
territory's admission, title remains in the federal government.17
In the Submerged Lands Act,18 Congress essentially codified the
equal footing doctrine's premise that a state acquires title to lands sub-
merged beneath navigable waterways in its territories. 19 Under this
Act, a state gains title and ownership to this land upon admission to
10. Article IV, Section 3 provides, in part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed
as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
11. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845); see also Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 50, 58 (1894).
12. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842).
13. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-96 (1987)
("Utah Lake"); see Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-14.
14. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410; Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.
15. Pollard's Lessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221.
16. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
374 (1977).
17. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64, 75 (1931) ("Colorado River"); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 583 (1922),
appeal denied, 260 U.S. 711 (1922); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1891).
18. 43 U.S.C. § 1301-1356 (1988).
19. Id. § 1311(a).
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the Union,20 and holds such lands in the public trust.21 This owner-
ship specifically includes "the natural resources within such lands and
waters," and entails "the right and power to manage, administer,
lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in ac-
cordance with applicable State law."22
In the area of regulation, the states' power to regulate beds of
navigable waters23 "is subject only to the paramount power of the
United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in in-
terstate and foreign commerce."24 In fact, for regulatory purposes, a
state is free to adopt its own definition of navigability. Under the State
of Alaska's expansive definition of navigability, 25 significantly more
waterways are considered navigable than under the more restrictive
federal definition.26 In the area of title disputes, however, Alaska's
definition of navigability is irrelevant, as the federal definition controls.
Although the equal footing doctrine is not absolute, exceptions
are rare. The federal government may convey land to a third party
prior to statehood, but only if an appropriate public purpose is served
by so doing.27 The United States Supreme Court has determined that
20. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 370; United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. at 6; Colorado River, 283 U.S. at 75 (1931); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28
(1894).
21. Illinois Central 1-R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). The Supreme Court
noted that a state's title to submerged lands "is a title held in trust for the people of
the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of
private parties." Id.
22. Id.
23. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
24. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14.
25. The State of Alaska defines "navigable water" as:
any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, bay,
sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other body
of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or subject to itsjurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public purpose, including
... commercial navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft,
and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing
or other public recreational purposes ....
ALAsKA STAT. § 38.05.965(12) (1989).
26. The federal definition of navigability was established in The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). The Supreme Court defined navigable waterways as wa-
terways that could be "used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condi-
tion, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." Id. at 563. For an analysis of
this definition, see infra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
27. This principle was established in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894):
We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the power to make grants of
lands below high water mark of navigable waters in any Territory of the
United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to perform
international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands for the
[Vol. 8:271
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it is Congress' policy to do this only in truly unusual circumstances,
and thus the Court will not lightly infer Congressional intent to defeat
a future state's title.28 Indeed, there is a strong presumption against
such conveyances. Submerged lands will not be considered to have
been conveyed unless Congress' intention was "definitely declared or
otherwise made plain, or was rendered in clear and especial words, or
unless the claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the wa-
ters .... "29
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma30 is the sole case in which the
United States Supreme Court has allowed the federal government to
defeat a state's title to submerged lands by conveying land prior to
statehood. The Court found that Congress, in a pre-statehood convey-
ance to the Choctaw Indians, intended to grant title to submerged
lands as well as the surrounding uplands.31 Subsequently, in Utah
Lake,32 the Court limited the precedential impact of Choctaw Nation
by stating that the conveyance to the Choctaw Indians was a "singular
exception" to the rule that title to submerged lands automatically vests
in a state upon statehood. 33 The basis for holding that Congress in-
tended to convey the submerged Choctaw lands was, according to the
Court, the unusual history of the Indian treaties involved, which ex-
plicitly guaranteed that no portion of the Choctaw Reservation would
ever become part of a state.34
The difficulty in overcoming the presumption in favor of the
equal footing doctrine is especially pertinent in Alaska, where the
Statehood Act disclaims all rights and title to property that "may be
held" by Natives or was being held by the United States in trust for
promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among
the several States, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the
objects for which the United States hold the Territory.
Id.
28. Utah Lake, 482 U.S. 193, 197 (1987).
29. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981) (citations omitted); see
also United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935) ("Dominion over navigable waters
and property in the soil under them are so identified with the sovereign power of
government that a presumption against their separation from sovereignty must be in-
dulged. .. ").
30. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
31. Id. at 635-36.
32. 482 U.S. 193 (1987).
33. Id. at 198.
34. Id. In the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the Choctaw Nation agreed to
leave Mississippi when the United States government granted them fee simple title to
their new land and guaranteed them that "no part of the land granted them shall ever
be embraced in any Territory or State." Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 625.
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Natives. 35 As discussed below, Gulkana River I1 specifically ad-
dressed this issue.
III. DETERMINING TITLE UNDER THE FEDERAL NAVIGABILITY
TEST36
Since the states' title to submerged lands is derived from the
United States Constitution, federal law has dictated the ground rules
for resolving title disputes. 37 As a state gains title only to lands sub-
merged beneath navigable waters, the first question to address in de-
termining title is whether or not the waterway is navigable. The
federal test of title navigability was formulated in The Daniel Ball.38
The premise underlying the Daniel Ball test is that if a stream is navi-
gable in fact, it is navigable in law.39 Waterways are navigable in fact
if they can be "used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water."4° Although initially viewed as establishing federal court ad-
miralty jurisdiction limits, the test has been extended to determina-
tions of navigability for title41 as well as for Commerce Clause
purposes.42 The Daniel Ball test has been consistently reaffirmed and
remains the standard for title navigability determinations in the fed-
eral courts.43
The most significant aspect of the Daniel Ball test concerns the
"highways for commerce" requirement. In an early Commerce Clause
35. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a), 72 Stat. 339 (codi-
fied as amended at 48 U.S.C. note 4 preceding § 21 (1982)).
36. For additional discussion of the federal navigability test, see Hollomon, supra
note 1, at 75-92.
37. United-States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926) ("Navigability,
when asserted as the basis of a right arising under the Constitution of the United
States, is necessarily a question of federal law to be determined according to the gen-
eral rule recognized and applied in the federal courts."); see also Utah v. United
States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) ("Great Salt Lake") ("The question of navigability is a
federal question.").
38. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
39. Id at 563.
40. Id
41. See, e.g., Alaska v. United States, 754 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985) ("Slopbucket Lake"); Colorado River, 283 U.S. 64, 75-76
(1931).
42. See, e.g., Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 644 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053 (1981); United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 387-89 (1940).
43. See, e.g., Great Salt Lake, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); Colorado River, 283 U.S. at
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case involving the Daniel Ball test, the Court indicated that "[t]he ca-
pability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and com-
merce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather
than the extent and manner of that use." 44 Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions focusing on title disputes have indicated that "the vital
and essential point is whether the natural navigation of the river is
such that it affords a channel for useful commerce, '45 and have con-
sistently reaffirmed that the use of the waterway as a highway for com-
merce "is the gist of the federal test.' ' 46 Great Salt Lake47 is the most
liberal interpretation of the highway for commerce requirement. In
this case, the Court concluded that evidence of ranchers transporting
their cattle from the mainland to an island was relevant in determining
navigability. 48 The Court indicated that it did not matter whether the
cattle were transported for ranching purposes or as water-borne
freight; the type of commerce involved was an "irrelevant detail." 49
The "used, or are susceptible of being used" portion of the Daniel
Ball test means that a determination of title navigability cannot de-
pend solely upon actual commercial development of the waterway. 0
As others have noted, the "susceptible" aspect of this requirement is
especially important in Alaska.51 Many Alaska waterways are very
isolated, and, consequently, little commerce has been conducted upon
them. Susceptibility permits a finding of navigability for remote wa-
terways that are capable of bearing trade or travel but have not been so
used because of the lack of demand for such uses. In Colorado River,52
the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that the Court
should look only at actual usage of the waterway at the time of state-
hood because future uses of the waterway were too speculative. The
Court noted that "the possibilities of growth and future profitable use
are not to be ignored."'5 3 It was a question of fact whether the water-
way in its ordinary condition could be brought into use by "the
44. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874) (emphasis added).
45. Colorado River, 283 U.S. at 86.
46. See, eg., Great Salt Lake, 403 U.S. at 11; Colorado River, 283 U.S. at 76;
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
47. 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id.
50. See, eg., Great Salt Lake, 403 U.S. at 12 (taking into consideration water
conditions which would have permitted commercial navigation).
51. See, e.g., Hollomon, supra note 1, at 88 ("In the Alaska context,... the courts
may well find many waterways navigable as a matter of law, even though as a matter
of fact there is no evidence of commercial use. The critical factor is the susceptibility
of such use.").




growth of the population, the multiplication of activities and the devel-
opment of natural resources."' 54 In general, this capacity may be
shown by observing a waterway's physical characteristics, as well as
by examining the uses to which it has been put.
The remaining portions of the Daniel Ball test concern the type of
evidence admissible to demonstrate that a body of water is susceptible
to use as a highway for commerce. The "ordinary condition" require-
ment functions on one level as a time restriction on pertinent evidence.
This phrase signifies that the test is applied to the waterway as it ex-
isted at the time of statehood, as if a snapshot had been taken of its
dimensions and configurations at that time. Subsequent changes in the
waterway are deemed immaterial to title navigability determinations.55
Therefore, if a waterway is navigable upon statehood, and subse-
quently becomes non-navigable, it is still deemed navigable in law.
This aspect of the ordinary condition requirement is insignificant in
Alaska because its waterways have remained virtually unchanged
since the time of Alaska's relatively recent statehood.
However, a second aspect of the ordinary condition requirement
indicates that "ordinary" is restricted to waterways that flow natu-
rally. In Alaska, where waterways can remain frozen for over six
months each year, determining the "ordinary condition" of a water-
way is potentially quite difficult. Frozen uses probably cannot be con-
sidered in determining if the waterway is navigable and therefore
susceptible to commerce. 56 In one case, the Supreme Court concluded
that a riverbed which is flooded for two weeks and dry for the remain-
der of the year would not be considered navigable in its "ordinary
condition. '57 By analogy, if a waterway is frozen for all but two weeks
of the year, courts would probably not consider it navigable in its "or-
dinary condition."58
54. Id.
55. Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1982).
Compared to the commerce clause use of the Daniel Ball test, this is quite stringent.
In commerce clause cases, the test is applied to the waterway as it exists at the time of
litigation, not as it appeared at the time of statehood. See, e.g., United States v. Appa-
lachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1940).
56. Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 468 n.13 (D. Alaska 1987), aff'd
sub nom. Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1949 (1990) ("Gulkana River F'). The court observed that the holding of the Supreme
Court in Slopbucket Lake "appear[ed] to preclude admission of evidence of ice use"
for the purpose of proving navigability. Id. (citing Slopbucket Lake, 754 F.2d 851,
854-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985)).
57. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922).
58. See Gulkana River I, 662 F. Supp. at 468 n. 13. Although a waterway running
freely for only two weeks a year would probably be considered non-navigable, the
court noted that "it is well established that climatic changes rendering a waterbody
[Vol. 8:271
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The "customary modes of trade and travel on water" aspect of
the test also restricts the type of evidence considered relevant to prove
use as a highway for commerce. Like the "ordinary condition" re-
quirement, the time restrictions imposed by this aspect are not espe-
cially relevant for Alaska because the modes of travel have changed
very little since the time of statehood. Yet this does not mean that all
modem kinds of watercraft will satisfy this element of the test. For
instance, the use of float planes was deemed irrelevant as evidence of
navigation because they merely pause upon the water prior to travel-
ing to another waterway and do not travel up, down or across the
waterway. 59 ' In general, though, this element favors a recent state like
Alaska because the types of craft used today are similar enough to be
deemed relevant in determining whether the body of water was suscep-
tible for use as a highway for commerce at the time of statehood. 60
Applying the federal title navigability test to Alaska waterways is
crucial in the context of public land conveyances by the federal gov-
ernment. If public lands contain submerged lands under navigable
waterways, the state holds title to the submerged lands and the federal
government cannot convey the lands to anyone else. A determination
of navigability thus becomes a key issue. The prevalence of public
land conveyances to the state and to Native groups makes navigability
a particularly vital issue for Alaska.
IV. ACHIEVING UNIFORMITY FOR ALASKA LAND CONVEYANCES:
THE CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT OF ANILCA
Title disputes over submerged lands in Alaska have been exacer-
bated by the methods the BLM has used to survey public land selec-
tions in Alaska. By relying on navigability determinations rather than
the established survey methods used in the lower forty-eight states,
BLM complicated the assessment of how submerged lands are con-
veyed and charged against the entitlements of the State of Alaska pur-
suant to the Statehood Act 61 and Native groups pursuant to the
non-navigable on a seasonal basis do not preclude a finding of overall navigability."
Id. (emphasis added).
59. Slopbucket Lake, 754 F.2d 851, 854-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968
(1985).
60. See, e.g., Gulkana River I, 891 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990) ("[IThe watercraft customary at statehood could have at least
supported commercial activity of the type carried on today, with minor modifications
due to a more limited load capacity and rudimentary technology.").
61. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a), 72 Stat. 339 (codi-
fied as amended at 48 U.S.C. note 4 preceding § 21 (1982)). So that the state could
own land within its boundaries, the Alaska Statehood Act authorized the state to
select roughly 104 million acres from "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved" fed-
eral lands within 35 years of statehood. Id.
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Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 62 In response to the navigabil-
ity problems hindering the survey and conveyance of public lands in
Alaska, Congress amended the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act in 1988.63 The "primary purpose" of this amendment
was "to clarify the conveyance and ownership of submerged lands by
Alaska Natives, Native Corporations and the State of Alaska." 64
The key issue in conveyance disputes is chargeability, which de-
termines how the acreage in a federal public land conveyance is as-
sessed against the entitlements due to the state and Native groups.
The issue is crucial because it involves balancing federal, state, and
Native interests in Alaska's submerged lands. Since designated sub-
merged lands are not counted against state and Native entitlements,
BLM's method of designating these submerged lands determines how
much additional land the federal government must transfer to the state
and to Native groups. Prior to the ANILCA amendment, the naviga-
bility aspect of the BLM's chargeability policy imposed significant ad-
ministrative, financial, and legislative burdens on the federal
government, state government and Native groups. 65 When Congress
enacted the ANILCA amendment, they essentially "'approve[d] and
clarif[ied] [the] agreement between the Department of the Interior, the
State of Alaska, and Alaska Native groups regarding land surveying
and conveyances in the State of Alaska.' ",66
Prior to its negotiated policy change, BLM's chargeability deter-
minations were based on whether the waterbodies on conveyed lands
were navigable. This practice arose from BLM's literal compliance
62. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1988) [hereinafter ANCSA]. ANCSA authorized
Native Alaskans to receive a substantial monetary payment and to select approxi-
mately 44 million acres from federal lands in exchange for releasing their aboriginal
claims to the land. rd.
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988) Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C. & 48 U.S.C.) (enacted to set aside certain federal lands for na-
tional use).
64. S. REP. No. 302, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1356.
65. See, e.g., CONG. REc. 23,377 (1980) ("Even a conservative extrapolation from
[recent litigation] gives some indication of the staggering administrative, financial, and
litagatory burden placed upon the Federal and State governments and the Native Cor-
porations by the present situation."); S. REP. No. 302 at 15, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1367 (statement of Robert F. Burford, director, Bureau of Land
Management, ]Department of the Interior) (BLM "favor[s] enactment of [the
ANILCA amendment] because it enacts into law the current policy of the Adminis-
tration with regard to submerged lands in Alaska and may eliminate the possibility of
much litigation.").
66. S. REP. No. 302 at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1359 (letter from
James L. Blum, acting director, Congressional Budget Office, to J. Bennet Johnston,
Jr., chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate).
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with section 6(g) of the Alaska Statehood Act.67 According to BLM's
reading of this section, when public lands selected by the State were
unsurveyed, the Secretary of the Interior must survey the exterior
boundaries and then issue a patent based on this survey. 68 In imple-
menting this statute, BLM essentially determined that the term "pub-
lic lands" included lands submerged beneath non-navigable waters. 69
To separate chargeable submerged lands from non-chargeable sub-
merged lands, BLM had to ascertain which submerged lands automat-
ically belonged to the state by virtue of the equal footing doctrine.
70
The only way for BLM to do this was to make a navigability determi-
nation of the waterbody.
Chargeability in Alaska thus became linked to navigability, which
meant that land selections could not be conveyed until BLM deter-
mined whether the selection contained navigable waterbodies. 71 Sig-
nificantly, the difficulties associated with calculating and litigating
navigability determinations were confined to public land conveyances
pursuant to the Statehood Act and ANCSA.72 For all other land con-
veyances inside and outside Alaska, BLM followed its long-established
policy of recognizing that title to lands bordering on non-navigable
waters extends to the center of these waters. 73 While entitlements of
the state government and Native groups were being charged for lands
under non-navigable waterbodies, all other recipients of federal land
conveyances were not charged for such lands. 74
The inequity of this discrepancy in BLM's chargeability policy
was initially resolved in 1983 when negotiations between BLM, the
67. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1364. The Act provides that
"[w]here any lands desired by the State are unsurveyed at the time of their selection,
the Secretary of the Interior shall survey the exterior boundaries of the area requested
without any interior subdivision thereof... ." Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-805, § 6(g), 72 Stat. 339 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. note 4 preceding
§ 21 (1982)).
68. S. REP. No. 302 at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1364.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Director of BLM noted that "BLM, in its efforts to convey the lands
that have been selected by the State and the Native Corporations, has been required to
make initial determinations as to the navigability of hundreds of lakes and rivers." Id.
72. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1363-64.
73. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1363. Authority for this position
is derived from the Act of May 18, 1796, which established that title to lands border-
ing on non-navigable streams extends to the center of the stream. Id. In Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, (1891), the Supreme Court extended this principle to nonnavi-
gable lakes or ponds, stating that "[i]t has been the practice of the government from its
origin, in disposing of the public lands, to measure the price to be paid for them by the
quantity of upland granted, no charge being made for the lands under the bed of the
stream, or other body of water." Hardin, 140 U.S. at 380.
74. S. REP. No. 302 at 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1365.
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state government, and Native groups led BLM to treat conveyances
under the Statehood Act and ANILCA the same way it treated all
other public land conveyances. 75 Under this negotiated agreement,
chargeability of submerged lands no longer depended solely upon the
navigability of waterways. Instead, chargeability was determined ac-
cording to the guidelines of the 1973 BLM Manual of Surveying In-
structions. 76 The manual requires that "all navigable bodies of water
and other important rivers and lakes" be segregated from the rest of
the land being surveyed.77 To ascertain the quantity of land remaining
after this segregation, all lakes of fifty acres or more78 and all rivers
wider than 198 feet must be "meandered. '79 Meandering is a survey-
ing term referring to a line shown on the survey plot that defines the
winding and curving of a waterbody's banks.80 When using this sur-
vey method, BLM excludes lands underneath meanderable waters
from the acreage total of the land selection; in essence, land beneath
large bodies of water passes to the grantee without charge. 81
BLM's decision to determine chargeability in Alaska by meander-
ing had a major impact on land conveyances to the state and Native
groups because it expanded both the definition and the beneficiaries of
non-chargeable submerged lands. As noted above, BLM previously
had required navigability in order for submerged lands in Alaska to be
non-chargeable. After BLM revised its chargeability policy, land un-
derneath large bodies of water, regardless of whether the waterbody
was navigable or non-navigable, was not charged against the acreage
entitlement of the state or Native groups.82
Despite the beneficial aspects of the revised BLM policy,
designating meanderable areas as non-chargeable excited a good deal
of controversy. Environmentalists believed that the policy effectively
75. Id.
76. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES (1973) [hereinafter MAN-
UAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS].
77. Id. at § 3-115.
78. Id. at § 3-121. Exceptions are made for artificial lakes and reservoirs, as well
as for shallow or poorly defined temporary lakes that form due to permafrost and lack
of drainage. Id.
79. The surveying term used in the manual to indicate the width of a meanderable
river is "3 chains wide." Id. at § 3-120. Each chain is 66 feet long; three chains
therefore total 198 feet. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 229 (6th ed. 1990).
80. MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 76, at § 3-115.
81. For an excellent treatment of the intricacies of this meandering technique, see
Hollomon, supra note 1, at 111-12.
82. See S. REP. No. 302 at 12, reprinied in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1365-66; see also
Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 14 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("under the new rule
BLM no longer, as a threshold matter, bothers to make navigability determinations at
all, but instead simply excludes submerged lands automatically from acreage totals.").
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relinquished millions of acres to the state and Native groups to the
detriment of the environment. In Wilderness Society v. Carruthers,83
the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club initiated suit against the
Department of the Interior, charging that the policy violated the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 84 and was contrary to Congress' intent in
enacting ANCSA and the Statehood Act.
The environmental groups argued that if a Native group or the
state had a choice between two plots of land, both of identical acreage,
the grantee would choose the plot with a larger amount of submerged
lands. By so doing, the grantee would obtain the same acreage but be
charged for fewer acres, thus allowing the grantee to choose additional
entitlements later.85 The groups maintained that this would allow the
state and the Native groups to obtain greater acreage than Congress
intended them to receive under ANCSA and the Statehood Act.86
While the environmentalists' argument that Congress did not in-
tend the BLM policy change may initially have been sound, Congress
laid any doubts about its intentions to rest in 1988 when it codified the
BLM policy changes. 87 Congress knew of the discord that the change
in BLM policy had created among environmentalists,88 yet chose to
uphold national uniformity in surveying and chargeability procedures.
Despite environmentalists' charges to the contrary, the ANILCA
amendment does not "give away" millions of acres to which the state
and Native corporations are not entitled. It merely brings the survey
and conveyance procedures used by the rest of the United States into
use in Alaska. 89
83. No. 84-1823 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 30, 1986) afl'd in part, rev'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part sub nom. Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
84. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1988).
85. Griles, 824 F.2d at 7.
86. Id.
87. ANILCA, supra note 63, § 1631(b)(1). When amending ANILCA, Congress
adopted the BLM policy changes in the following provision:
Whenever... the Secretary conveys land to a Native, a Native Corporation,
or the State pursuant to [ANCSA, the Statehood Act] or this Act which
abuts or surrounds a meanderable lake, river, or stream, all right, title, and
interest of the United States, if any, in the land under such lake, river, or
stream lying between the uplands and the median line or midpoint, as the
case may be, shall vest in and shall not be charged against the acreage entitle-
ment of such Native or Native Corporation or the State.
Id. (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., CONG. REc. S1599 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1985); Senator Murkowski
noted that the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society had recently challenged the
Department of the Interior's revised procedure for surveying public lands in Alaska.
The senator concluded that "pursuit of this litigation will result in burdensome cost to
all the interested parties and only delay resolution of the ultimate problem." Id.
89. See Hearings on H. R. 2629, supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
1991]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
In fact, by making the amendment retroactive, Congress empha-
sized the inequity of the previous BLM policy in Alaska. The amend-
ment requires that all state and Native land selections, conveyed
before or after the enactment of the amendment, that "abut[] or sur-
round[] a meanderable lake, river, or stream.., shall not be charged
against the acreage entitlement of such Native or Native Corporation
or the State." 90
Ultimately the ANILCA amendment should make the federal
government more efficient in passing title to submerged lands.9' Be-
cause BLM must make a navigability determination only if the water-
way is relatively small, and thus non-meanderable, and because there
is no requirement that BLM conduct a ground survey,92 delays in con-
veying title to land will be drastically reduced. This saves time and
money for all parties involved.93
Eliminating chargeability disputes does not guarantee that title
disputes will also disappear.94 Disputes over title are still quite likely
if, for instance, natural resources are discovered on submerged lands
that are being conveyed to a Native group. In this case, the state is
likely to claim title to the submerged lands under the equal footing
90. 43 U.S.C. § 1631(b)(1) (1988).
91. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986). The Senate Report
on clarifying the status of submerged lands in Alaska specifically mentioned the costs
involved when navigability is linked to chargeability:
This [section of the ANILCA amendment] clarifies that if a lake, river,
stream or other body of water is required to be meandered, BLM is not
required to expend the time, money and resources necessary to make an
administrative determination as to whether the lake, river, stream or other
body of water is or is not navigable, or whether title to the land beneath the
lake, river, stream or other body of water did or did not vest in the State of
Alaska at statehood.
Id.
92. ANILCA, supra note 63, § 1631(a)(4) ("Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to require ground survey or monumentation of meanderlines."). It is fortu-
nate that ground surveys are not required, as they are quite labor and time intensive.
93. Today, the process of photogrammetry (aerial photography) may be used to
survey meander lines. Although this procedure takes time and money, it does not
require a person to complete an entire survey while remaining in a remote area, and
thus is less time-intensive. According to the BLM manual, "meander corners" (the
intersection of the bank of a navigable water and a survey standard, township or sec-
tion line) must be established in the "regular manner,"'i.e., in the field, before photo-
grammetry may proceed. MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 76, §§ 3-
117, 3-123. Photogrammetry has the additional benefit of creating a lasting memorial
of the area surveyed in a photographic image.
94. The director of BLM conceded that "[a]lthough the Department's current
policy concerning the chargeability of submerged lands has eliminated many of the
problems associated with conveyances of selected lands in Alaska, the problem con-
cerning navigability decisions remains unresolved." S. REP. No. 302 at 14, reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1367.
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doctrine. Conveying such lands to a Native group would not resolve a
title dispute because the federal government can only convey to Native
groups whatever title it has in public lands. Since lands under naviga-
ble waterways pass automatically to the state under the equal footing
doctrine, title to such lands can not be conveyed to Native groups by
the federal government. The meanderable/non-meanderable distinc-
tion made for chargeability purposes would not prevent title disputes
in this situation. A determination of the navigability of the waterbody
involved would be necessary to determine title. In fact, the Gulkana
River I1 decision illustrates the continued potential for title navigabil-
ity disputes.
V. EXPANDING NAVIGABILITY: THE GULKANA RIVER II
DECISION
Gulkana River I 95 was the first major title navigability case de-
cided after the BLM policy changes were implemented in Alaska. The
Ninth Circuit's determination that the Gulkana River was navigable is
crucial for future title dispute cases that are based on navigability. For
the first time, a river was deemed navigable even though the primary
use of the river was recreational. The fact that certain recreational
uses can be "commerce" within the federal title navigability test sug-
gests that the potential recreational use of Alaska's remote waterways
may prove significant for navigability determinations. By including
recreational uses within "commerce," more waterways could be
deemed navigable, thus vesting title to the lands beneath them in the
state under the workings of the equal footing doctrine; as such, these
submerged lands would not be subject to conveyance by the federal
government.
The title dispute over the Gulkana river bed arose early in the
summer of 1979, when BLM determined that the lower thirty miles of
the river were not navigable, and thus not owned by the State of
Alaska under the equal footing doctrine.96 BLM subsequently made
an interim conveyance of the submerged land to Ahtna, Inc., a Native
corporation.97 The State of Alaska filed suit in federal district court
against the United States and Ahtna, Inc., seeking to quiet title and
95. 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990).
96. See Gulkana River I, 662 F. Supp. 455, 457 (D. Alaska 1987), affid sub nom.
Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949
(1990). The non-navigable portion of the river is basically that which lies between the
Richardson Highway Bridge and the confluence of the Copper River. Id. at 466.
97. Id. at 457. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act authorized the creation
of Native corporations, through which Native groups could make land selections ac-
cording to their entitlement. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1988). Sta-Keh Corporation
and Ahtna, Inc., were the properly authorized Native corporations that obtained the
interim conveyance of the disputed portion of the Gulkana River from BLM. Prior to
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receive a declaratory judgment concerning the navigability of the
Gulkana River and the relevancy of criteria utilized by BLM in mak-
ing its determination of non-navigability. 98 The United States subse-
quently disclaimed ownership in all but the upper reaches of the
Gulkana River,99 and the state of Alaska dismissed any claim to the
remaining upper reaches of the river in which the United States still
claimed an interest. 1°° As a result of these actions, no dispute re-
mained between Alaska and the United States concerning the quiet
title portion of the suit.101 The district court retained jurisdiction,
however, over the navigability determination of the lower thirty miles
of the Gulkana River.102 The controversy also remained alive because
Ahtna, Inc., did not join the federal disclaimer of the lower portion of
the river. 103
There were extensive stipulations of fact in the district court, the
most notable being that the Gulkana River's attributes, its slow mov-
ing and relatively shallow, narrow waters, had not changed apprecia-
bly since statehood.' °4 The parties also agreed that the river was
frequently used by those running the Sourdough Campground to
transport campers to and from the Richardson Highway Bridge. 10 5
Modern power boats such as jet unit craft and aluminum river boats
were routinely used, as were canoes and inflatable rafts. 10 6 The most
common use of this portion of the river, however, involved recreation-
alists using their own watercraft to travel to the Sourdough Camp-
ground.10 7 The court found that the stipulated facts were "more than
sufficient" to satisfy the federal test of navigability, holding that the
lower thirty miles of the river were navigable as a matter of law, and
trial in the district court, the two Native corporations merged, and Ahtna, Inc., was
the surviving entity. Gulkana River I, 662 F. Supp. at 456 n.2.
98. Id. at 4.57.
99. Id. at 457-58. This action was taken pursuant to the Judiciary Procedure Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d) (1988).
100. Gulkana River I, 662 F. Supp. at 458.
101. Id.
102. Id. (retaining jurisdiction under 43 U.S.C. § 1631).
103. Id. Ahtna still had a live controversy with Alaska as to the title of the lower
30 miles of the river. The federal government only had a live controversy in regards to
the navigability of those 30 miles. Id.
104. Id. at 466. Much of the lower 30 miles of the Gulkana River has depth of
three to six feet and width of 150 feet. Portions of the river above the Richardson
Highway Bridge are only one foot deep. In some areas, the river flows at a rate of
two-to-three miles per hour. Id.
105. Id. at 4.67-68.
106. Id. at 468. Typically, boats for hire transport the campers in 16-to-24-foot flat
or round-bottomed boats, 12-to-15-and-a-half-foot inflatable rafts, and 15-to-19-foot




therefore the submerged lands beneath the river belonged to the
state. 10
8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had
misstated the Daniel Ball test by assuming that navigability could be
satisfied by evidence of either trade or travel.1 09 According to the dis-
trict court, the Daniel Ball test implicitly equated routes for travel and
routes for conducting commerce. 110 However, the Ninth Circuit used
a more traditional reading of the Daniel Ball test and based its deci-
sion to affirm the district court on its own analysis of commercial ac-
tivity on the Gulkana River.'
Ahtna and its amicus 12 argued that the principal uses of the
Gulkana were recreational and thus not "commerce" under the Daniel
Ball test. 113 In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that transporting recreationalists for hire on the Gulkana River had
evolved into a substantial industry that employed approximately four
hundred persons. 114 Although the court noted that the extent of ex-
isting commerce is not conclusive proof of navigability for title pur-
poses, the court found that determining a river to be non-navigable
merely because its use primarily relates to recreation was "too narrow
a view of commercial activity." '11 s The court recognized that naviga-
bility was a "flexible concept" and that each time a court applied the
Daniel Ball test it "'is apt to uncover variations .and refinements
which require further elaboration.' 1116 The court then held that
"[u]nder the facts of this case.., the present use of the lower Gulkana
is commercial and provides conclusive evidence of the lower
Gulkana's susceptibility for commercial use at statehood." 117
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Ahtna's reservation of title argu-
ment. 118 Ahtna admitted that a state generally obtained title to lands
108. Id.
109. Gulkana River II, 891 F.2d 1401, 1404 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 110 S.
Ct. 1949 (1990) (citing Gulkana River I, 662 F. Supp. at 463 (quoting Great Salt Lake,
403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971))).
110. Gulkana River I, 662 F. Supp. at 464 ("It is difficult to imagine a situation in
which a waterbody is susceptible to use as a transportation route yet not susceptible to
use as a highway for commerce.").
111. Gulkana River I, 891 F.2d at 1405.
112. Arctic Slope Regional Corporation joined Ahtna as amicus. Id. at 1403.
113. Id. at 1405. Although the issue was first raised on appeal, the court chose to
discuss the merits of Ahtna's argument because the issue was "purely legal and the
facts [were] fully developed." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,406
(1940)).
117. Id.
118. Id. The court of appeals reached this issue although it was initially raised on
appeal, and summarily dismissed this possible barrier to the state's title. Id.
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submerged beneath navigable waters upon statehood, but the Native
corporation argued that the federal government, in enacting ANCSA,
indicated that Natives "may have held title" to the submerged land.1 19
Reading this language in conjunction with the Statehood Act, Ahtna
argued that there was an indication of Congressional intent to reserve
title to the Natives. 120 The court determined that for Ahtna to prevail,
it would have to overcome the strong presumption against convey-
ances to an entity other than the state. To do so, it would have to
show that Congress clearly intended to include the submerged lands in
the federal reservation, and to "defeat the future State's title to such
land." 121 As Ahtna had not met this high burden, the argument was
quickly dismissed. The Ninth Circuit, using an expanded definition of
navigability under the federal navigability test, therefore affirmed the
district court's finding that the state held title to the submerged lands
under the Gulkana River.
VI. ASSESSING THE FUTURE OF SUBMERGED LAND TITLE
DISPUTES
The combined effect of the ANILCA amendment and the
Gulkana River II decision gives the State of Alaska an edge in future
disputes over federal land grants. Because Congress considered fed-
eral uniformity more significant than Alaska's unique geography, the
ANILCA amendment gives the state efficient access to ownership of
land under large, non-navigable bodies of water. As discussed above,
Native groups and the federal government also benefit from this effi-
cient transfer of federal lands. However, the Ninth Circuit's liberal
interpretation of the Daniel Ball test further favors the state by permit-
ting the state to present recreational use, or potential for such use, as
evidence of navigability.
These developments initially may be interpreted as undeserved
windfalls to the state's share of federal lands in Alaska. In a larger
sense, however, these developments counteract the results of imposing
a rigidly uniform federal navigability test developed for the lower
forty-eight states. Because Alaska has an unusually high proportion of
non-navigable frozen bodies of water, the state's ownership of sub-
merged lands is restricted to a much greater extent than the other
states in the union. 122 Thus, changes made for the sake of federal uni-
formity that benefit the State of Alaska may be viewed as simply bal-
ancing out the inequities that result from a uniform navigability test.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1405-06.
122. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, the case law providing a more modem and realistic interpre-
tation of commerce also helps to redress the inequities of defining navi-
gability in a manner that potentially excludes so many of Alaska's
waterways.
VII. CONCLUSION
Title to Alaska's submerged lands has been disputed since Alaska
gained statehood; such disputes are not likely to end because of one
case and one amendment to a statute. However, the ANILCA amend-
ment has eliminated many disputes over the chargeability of sub-
merged land under meanderable waters, and the Gulkana River II
decision has broadened the definition of "commerce" as used in the
Daniel Ball title navigability test. The combination of these two fac-
tors seem to be lifting some of the clouds that have darkened titles to
Alaska's submerged lands.
Denise Dosier

